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#1 06-12-2010 19:36:27

Réputation :   52 

wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

je me permet de relayer l'information tel qu'elle fut analysée

Reference ID     Created     Released     Classification     Origin
09BAKU749     2009-09-18 11:11     2010-12-01 21:09     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Baku

DE RUEHKB #0749/01 2611117
P 181117Z SEP 09

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000749



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2034

¶B. BAKU 534
¶C. 08 BAKU 1136
¶F. BAKU 287

Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev
utilizes distinctly different approaches to foreign and
domestic policies.  He typically devises the former with
pragmatism, restraint and a helpful bias toward integration
with the West, yet at home his policies have become
increasingly authoritarian and hostile to diversity of
political views.  This divergence of approaches, combined
with his father's continuing omnipresence, has led some
observers to compare the Aliyevs with the fictional
"Corleones" of Godfather fame, with the current president
described alternately as a mix of "Michael" and "Sonny."
Either way, this Michael/Sonny dichotomy complicates our
approach to Baku and has the unfortunate effect of framing
what should be a strategically valuable relationship as a
choice between U.S. interests and U.S. values.  End Summary.

¶2.  (S/NF) This striking aspect of President Ilham Aliyev's
governing style was very neatly summed up recently by the
witty, but somewhat past-his-prime XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect).  Commenting
on the GOAJ's harsh reaction to the YouTube "donkey video"
(Reftel A), XXXXXXXXXXXX quipped to the Charge that what one must
understand about Aliyev, "He's not Michael Corleone, he's
Sonny."  To some in Baku, XXXXXXXXXXXX Godfather analogy seems
apt - capturing essential truths not only about Ilham Aliyev,
but his father Heydar, who becomes by implication the "Vito
Corleone" of Azerbaijan.  With that in mind, this cable
attempts to explain who Ilham Aliyev is and why he does what
h does.  Aside from XXXXXXXXXXXX analogy, it also owe much to
the appraisals of Michael and Sonny from "The Godfather
Doctrine (2008)," by John Hulsman and A. Wess Mitchell.

"That's my family, Kay.  It's not me."

¶3.  (C) Ilham Aliyev inherited a newly independent,
resource-rich state, brought to order in the post-Soviet era
by this father, Heydar Aliyev, scarred by a catastrophic war
with Armenia that resulted in occupation of the
Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and seven surrounding Azerbaijani
regions.  He assumed the presidency in 2003, concurrent with
his father's death, in an election marked by a lack of
competition and debate, at a time when Azerbaijan's
re-developed oil and gas resources were being brought on line
for export.  Dogged by widespread doubts about his
suitability for leadership based on his age (then 41), lack
of achievements and a "playboy" image, he oversaw the launch
of a one million-barrels-per-day oil pipeline, which has
flooded official and unofficial coffers in Baku and serves as
the financial backbone of the country.

¶4.  (C) The President and his cohorts, who largely were
carried over from his father's administration, now seek
predictability, stability and continuity to preserve and
protect public and private fortunes.  Ilham Aliyev's
landslide 2008 re-election was followed by a hastily-called
March 2009 referendum, which among other things removed term
limits for the President.  Aliyev's cabinet has changed very
little over the years, with few "reformers" brought in or
remaining in power.  The Prime Minister position is largely
ceremonial and weak.  Because of family connections, dynastic
succession, the strong arming of the opposition and the
creation of an elaborate patronage/protection network, the
Aliyev Administration has developed an "organized crime"
image in some quarters, leading some analysts to see Ilham
Aliyev at times in a mafia-like role.

"Never hate your enemies.  It affects your judgment."

BAKU 00000749  002 OF 004

--------------------------------------------- --------

¶5.  (C) In their short study "The Godfather Doctrine,"
Hulsman and Mitchell present brothers Sonny and Michael
Corleone from "The Godfather" as exemplars of two out of
three schools of U.S. foreign policy thought (with
consigliere Tom Hagen representing the third.)  However,
there are important points they raise about the two that
apply well to Aliyev and his policies abroad and at home.
Michael, they write, is a talented balancer of alliances,
aware of limitations on his own power who, importantly, knows
when something isn't personal, but only business.  Sonny, by
contrast, is brash, impulsive, and puts blind faith in force
to address affronts to the Corleone family.  For him,
business is personal.  Finally, Sonny refuses to contemplate
a present or a future in which the Corleone family does not
dominate New York, despite obvious and growing portents to
the contrary.

"This is business, not personal" - Balanced Foreign Policy
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶6.  (S) President Aliyev inherited from his father a clever,
realistic foreign policy that he has largely maintained.
With the overarching goal of maintaining and increasing
Azerbaijan's independence and sovereignty, he encourages
involvement with NATO and Euro-Atlantic security and
political structures and supports a policy of westward
transit of Azerbaijani oil and gas through non-Russian
channels.  Otherwise, though, he alternates between
assertiveness and appeasement where his powerful neighbors
Russia and Iran are concerned.  For example, Azerbaijan
routinely accuses Russia of supplying Armenia with weapons
and pointedly absents itself from the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), while participating in GUAM.  At
the same time, Aliyev constantly plays up his relations with
President Medvedev with frequent visits and has kept open the
channels of negotiation on energy issues, concluding a small
but symbolically important agreement with Gazprom to supply
gas to Dagestan (Reftel B).  He is assertive enough to defend
Azerbaijan's prerogative for an independent policy, but
discreet enough that he is in no danger of joining
Saakashvili on Moscow's hit list.

¶7.  (S) In foreign policy, Aliyev has also been able to
maintain generally the distinction between "business and
personal."  For all his bluster about Azerbaijan's legal
right to liberate the Armenian-occupied territories by force,
Aliyev has worked constructively on the Minsk Group-proposed
Basic Principles and developed a reportedly good rapport with
Armenian President Sargsian - in contrast to the much more
confrontational relationship between the countries' foreign
ministers.  Similarly, even as Aliyev regards with horror the
prospect of Turkey-Armenia rapprochement ahead of
Nagorno-Karabakh resolution, the President has instructed
SOCAR to continue gas transit and supply talks with Turkey,
and no one in Baku has dared to consider a cut in oil exports
through the BTC pipeline.  The gas transit talks are a
hardball affair to be sure, but Aliyev surely recognizes that
Azerbaijan cannot really afford a total rupture with Turkey
and certainly is not going to go so far as to foreclose on
options out of pique while the Turkey-Armenia question
remains open.

"You touch my sister again and I'll kill you." - The Hardliner
--------------------------------------------- -----------------

¶8.  (S) For all of the cool-headed calculation that generally
influences Aliyev's foreign policy, his domestic policies are
another matter.  As Aliyev perceives a challenge to his
authority or affronts to his family dignity, even minor ones,
he and his inner circle are apt to react (or overreact), much
to the detriment of the country's democratic development and
movement toward Western alliances.  The example of the crude
retaliation against the young bloggers Emin Milli and Adnan
Hajizade is the most recent and public example (Reftel A).
Earlier, defending his decision to rescind licenses for
foreign broadcasters, Aliyev expressed his anger that Radio

BAKU 00000749  003 OF 004

Liberty had mocked his plan to build the world's tallest
flagpole in the Baku port area, demonstrating exceedingly
thin skin (Reftel C).

¶9.  (S/NF) It is examples like these that inspired XXXXXXXXXXXX
quip to the Charge about Sonny and Michael.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
elaborated on the point in that conversation, recalling times
when he was an XXXXXXXXXXXX and similar
situations arose.  Heydar would never have allowed himself to
be goaded into ridiculous reactions, he said.  (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX memory on this might be a little selective, but he
has a point that the space for opinion was wider under the
last President, a view often echoed by journalists who look
back to the 1990s nostalgically.  End Note.)  Ilham Aliyev,
in XXXXXXXXXXXX view, is not inclined to subtlety or
deliberation in his response to these kinds of issues.

"I don't feel I have to wipe everybody out.  Just my enemies."Q----------------------------------- --------------------------

¶10.  (S) Aliyev takes the actions he does in order to
eliminate even the semblance of risk to his political
prominence.  His goal appears to be a political environment
in which the Aliyev dynasty is unchallenged, which was
demonstrated by the hastily organized March 2009
constitutional referendum removing presidential term limits.
This strangled the hopes of any and all pretenders to
succession, including his wife (who in Azeri politics is
thought of as a rival Pashayev, not an Aliyev).

¶11.  (S) The dissonance between Aliyev's sensible approach to
foreign affairs, manifested by the cosmopolitan image he
presents to Western visitors, with his tailored suits and
flawless English, and the unpleasant reality of his approach
to domestic issues raises the obvious question of how these
two realities coexist.  One explanation is that Aliyev is
insecure in domestic politics and relies heavily on the
advice of old-line Soviet-style political figures carried
forward from his father's administration, such as
Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev.  Alternatively,
Aliyev's domestic actions are free choices made in accordance
with his instincts, with Mehdiyev and others playing the

¶12.  (S) Occasionally, Aliyev's confident tough-guy image
gives way to an impression that he is yielding on domestic
issues.  Outside pressure does not always fail.  A recent
positive example was the outcome of the parliament's
initiative to ram through a Russian-style law on NGOs.  In
the face of a domestic outcry - including from
government-supported NGOs, the Presidential Administration
intervened to prevent the law as drafted from passing (Reftel
D).  Likewise, the President recently rejected a bill from
parliament that would have required foreign-based entities to
hire vetted Azerbaijanis citizens as deputy directors.  The
business community strongly opposed this bill (Reftel E).
Also, the government earlier this year released one of the
prominent journalists whose imprisonment was widely believed
to have been politically motivated (Reftel F).

"Keep your friends close and your enemies closer."
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶13.  (S) Comment:  It is clear that Azerbaijan's future
development would better suit United States policy goals if
Aliyev pursued his domestic policies in a manner that
resembled his foreign policy methods, however imperfect they
may be.  A full-scale democratic conversion, however, is an
unlikely outcome, and the record of presidents in this region
leaving office voluntarily is rather thin.  What is desirable
and perhaps achievable, however, is that Aliyev would govern
as a manager of alliances, viewing the political space
occupied by dissents as a source of ideas and a warning
system for when policies are hurting the national interest;
and ceasing to feel that he should strike hard at every
criticism that arises, or that he can do so without
consequences.  At least this type of evolution would better
prepare Azerbaijan for the post-Ilham Aliyev era, whenever

BAKU 00000749  004 OF 004

that begins.

¶14.  (S) Comment Continued:  Here is where the Godfather
analogy begins to break down.  In Azerbaijan the role of
loyal consigliere to the father and the son is played by the
long-time head of Presidential Administration Ramiz Mehdiyev.
Mehdiyev is no calm, conciliating Tom Hagen.  We do not know
if President Aliyev personally ordered the many iron-fisted
domestic initiatives, although he almost certainly approved
them, even if after-the-fact.  We do see Mehdiyev's
fingerprints all over the arrests of journalists, the
stifling of opposition leaders, the closure of mosques, the
restrictions on the media and the general law-and-order
approach to governance.  Is he the puppet or the
puppet-master?  At age 71 and often seen in frail health,
this is an increasingly important question.  While the rule
of 47-year old Ilham Aliyev could continue for decades, it
would be most likely without the benefit of his consigliere.
Without Mehdiyev, it is not clear whom Aliyev will turn to
for help in maintaining the same firm grip on the instruments
of power.

¶15.  (U) "Don Corleone, I need a man with powerful friends .
. . I need all of those policians you carry around in your
pocket, like so many nickels and dimes."

Hors ligne


#2 06-12-2010 19:37:49

Réputation :   52 

Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Reference ID     Created     Released     Classification     Origin
09BAKU744     2009-09-18 06:06     2010-12-03 21:09     CONFIDENTIAL     Embassy Baku
Appears in these articles:

DE RUEHKB #0744/01 2610632
R 180632Z SEP 09



E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019

Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Rob Garverick, Reasons 1.4 (a) and (d


¶1. (C) The Kashgai are a little-studied, semi-nomadic
Turkic minority in Iran with a history of anti-government
resistance. Recent interviews with Kashgai members,
supplemented with information from other Iranians, suggest
that most of the 1.5 million Kashgai, while still poorly
educated and impoverished, are adapting to many aspects of
modern life, including the internet. While many Kashgai
still seek to preserve their traditional migratory ways,
urbanization of Kashgai appears to be increasing. Tehran's
abandonment of forced settlement policies in favor of
economic incentives for those who wish to settle, and
improved education and economic infrastructure, has reduced
Kashgai-Tehran tension, and encouraged voluntary settlement
trends. Memories of the brutal repression of Kashgai
resistors in the 1980's, combined with improved economic
status and increased integration with the outside world have
also reduced temptations toward unrest. Today, only about
one third of the Kashgai are actively maintaining their
traditional tribal and migratory lifestyle, though cultural
traditions remain strong. Though proud to be Kashgai, there
is no meaningful autonomy movement, and self identification
of Kashgai as also being "Iranians" is increasing. According
to sources, most Kashgai are satisfied with the current
system and probably voted for Ahmadinejad. Once the stuff of
village nightmares, the modern Kashgai are largely
apolitical, peaceful, patriotically Iranian, and the object
of increasing tourism. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Baku Iran watcher met separately with two Iranian
Kashgai minority members,xxxxxxxxxxxx Both grew up in traditional Kashgai
households (though the former ran away to be educated as a
teenager). Taken together, the two sources (both unknown to
each other), provided interesting social and political
perspectives on this significant but comparatively
little-known Iranian minority group. The following account
of current life and attitudes among the Kashgai is taken from
these interviews and supplementary conversations with
non-Kashgai Iranians.

Lords of the Mountains

¶3. (SBU) The Kashgai (AKA Qashgai) are a 400-year old Turkic
language tribal confederation numbering approximately 1.5
million people. Their lifestyle, still pursued by a majority
of members, is based on nomadic sheep and goat herding.
Traditionally famed as fiercely independent "Lords of the
(Zagros) Mountains," the Turkish-speaking Kashgai
historically maintained a tense relationship with the mainly
Persian-speaking villagers and farmers through whose
territory they traveled, traded, and (sometimes) raided, and
by whom they were regarded with hostility and fear. Today,
about a third of the Kashgai herders and their families still
live a semi-nomadic lifestyle, moving over 300 kilometers
twice a year between summer and winter pasture areas located
outside of Isfahan and Shiraz, respectively. Other Kashgai
have combined herding with sedentary farming, or moved to
urban centers or abroad. Some of these remain sentimentally
attached to the old lifestyle, and seek to maintain ties with
it in some fashion.

¶4. (SBU) Thirty years ago the twice-a-year seasonal trek
took three months each way; now some Kashgai travel in two
days by truck to the pasture areas, and make camp while
awaiting the arrival of the herds (which are sometimes also
moved by truck, but over a longer time period, stopping
frequently for road side forage). Camels and horses are
still part of Kashgai life, but reportedly are more and more
regarded as "status symbols" items rather than necessities.
Families often pool income, and sources noted that some
normally city-based wage earners also return for short
periods to participate in festivals and assist with the herd
movement and resettlement.

¶5. (SBU) The Kashgai are historically among Iran's most
turbulent minority groups, engaging in repeated twentieth
century incidents of massive armed resistance against central

BAKU 00000744 002 of 003

government policies and control as late as 1982; a Persian
Isfahani related that his grandfather was decorated by the
Shah for organizing local villagers to fight them.
Long-standing efforts by the Iranian state to force their
permanent settlement were largely abandoned after the fall of
the Shah, when many forcibly settled Kashgai abandoned
farming and returned to their traditional herding ways.
Although the Kashgai's previously exiled, anti-Shah
traditional leaders were initially embraced by Khomeinei,
they rejected Islamic rule and perceived efforts by the new
regime to enforce settlement. After a government-broken
peace treaty, the returned exile Khosrow Khan and many other
prominent Kashgai (including its Majlis members) were hanged
by the Revolutionary Guard in 1982. The last widely accepted
Ilkhan (tribal high chief) renounced politics, and died a
natural death in 1984. The Persian Isfahani said that today
the Kashgai are widely viewed by other Iranians as a "simple,
honest, hospitable people who are easy to cheat."

"The Days of the Khans are Over"

¶6. (C) While both sources said that hereditary tribal and
clan leaders still command respect, and often serve as
informal adjudicators on internal Kashgai matters, xxxxxxxxxxxx
stated flatly that "the day of the Khans is over." xxxxxxxxxxxx
claimed that while Khosrow Khan is still regarded as
a hero by many Kashgai, mentioning his name in public is
forbidden," and could lead to arrest or other problems. He
stressed that most Kashgai are not focused on politics,
although asserting that awareness of and pride in their
cultural distinctiveness is high. He added that increased
literacy, internet access, tourism, and a growing
international diaspora have buttressed previously declining
cultural practices, especially handicrafts, dancing, and
music. He said that he himself is active with urbanized and
diaspora Kashgai in creating websites and publishing
magazines targeting a Kashgai audience. He also helps market
Kashgai international and domestic tour packages that include
sleeping in tents, dancing and music performances, hiking and
riding excursions, etc. "Economics is achieving what force
could not achieve," observed xxxxxxxxxxxx.

Liking Karroubi, Voting Ahmedinejad
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶7. (C) Both sources opined that the large majority of
Kashgai personally like Mehdi Karroubi, regarding him
favorably as an ethnic Lur with sympathy and understanding
for their traditions. However, both stressed that most
Kashgai are apolitical and pragmatic, and focused on their
immediate personal situation, not larger issues. For this
reason, they opined that most Kashgai probably voted for
Ahmadinejad, as a result of gratitude for improved health,
education, and infrastructure services and/or monetary
inducements. Overall, they opined that most Kashgai have
little interest in the election issue, seeing it as "Tehran's

¶8. (C) Both sources related approvingly that since the
mid-1980,s the central regime has moved away from forced
settlement to more relaxed and nuanced policies allowing
peaceful herding to be pursued, but offering economic and
social incentives (including free housing, electricity, and
cash subsidies) for those who are willing to settle.
Education is mandatory for all children until the age of
twelve; many are taught in tent schools by teachers
(sometimes also Kashgai) who travel with the community. The
merchant said that school curricula include instruction in
officially "correct" Islamic religious beliefs and rituals,
and "teach Persian (not Kashgai) history, language, and
culture." According to sources, few Kashgai focus on
religion or seek clerical careers, and mostly Persian mullahs
who teach religion or visit to proselytize are "tolerated,"
but not followed. Kashgai women work outside and do not
wear the chador except when visiting towns.

Economic Conditions

¶9. (C) Both sources noted that pursuit of education beyond
age twelve is becoming more common, though this often
requires abandonment of the transhumant lifestyle, and is
still resisted by some adults as a source of alienation.

BAKU 00000744 003 of 003

Defying clan elders runs the risk of becoming an outcast.
xxxxxxxxxxxx who ran away at sixteen, to avoid a forced marriage
and obtain further education, said that it took many years
for him to reforge links to the community. Both said that
many young Kashgai males now seek work as unskilled labor in
the cities, providing remittances and returning periodically
to help out the family. Many of these end up in Turkey,
where employment opportunities are better and their native
language is understood. Others try to make it to Europe or
North America, legally or not. He noted that most young
Kashgai are internet-literate, and are utilizing the internet
to create and follow Kashgai websites promoting information
on Kashgai traditions and culture, connecting to the
diaspora, and assisting with job searches and other economic
issues. He said that Kashgai young also use the internet to
tap into international mass (mainly youth) culture sites xxxxxxxxxxxx
claimed that many young herders "follow the NBA... and
listen to rap."

¶10. (SBU) Some Kashgai seek education to become health
workers or teachers, others become unskilled workers or seek
work with traders shuttling back and forth from towns where
they specialize in selling Kashgai carpets and handicrafts to
Iranians and foreigners. The resulting remittances are used
by their families to buy trucks and other more expensive hard
goods; less expensive hard goods and consumables are still
acquired through barter of fresh meat and live sheep to
(mainly Persian) villagers and merchants. Government
subsidies, good prices for lamb and wool, and sale of
handicrafts have combined to increase Kashgai prosperity in
recent years, though most are still impoverished. While
Kashgai carpets are world renowned, xxxxxxxxxxxx
observed that most of the income from this business does not
reach the Kashgai, since most of the Kashgai handicraft
business is in the hands of non-Kashgai merchants and
government buyers. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that Kashgai
carpets that take several months to make and retail for more
than a thousand dollars typically earn its (generally female)
maker as little as fifty dollars.

"We are Iranians"

¶11. (C) Despite sporadic central government efforts to
obstruct tribal movements, enforce Persian norms of Islam and
strict dress codes for women, and exact excessive bribes,
both sources denied that severe state-Kashgai tensions exist,
and portrayed the Kashgai as politically quiescent since the
1980,s. They stressed that, unlike other traditionally
restive Iranian minorities (e.g., Baluchis, Kurds, and Arabs)
there is no significant Kashgai separatist or autonomy
movement. The sources noted that, in contrast to these
Sunni-majority groups, the Kashgai, like most Persians, are
overwhelmingly Sh'ia and thus do not suffer the religious
discrimination reportedly experienced by Sunni Iranians.
They also pointed out that, unlike other minorities, the
Kashgai are not linked to populations in other countries,
have no written language (obviating many cultural issues),
and have no historical "national" ideology. In addition,
they noted, both urbanized and traditional transhumant
Kashgai are increasingly tied to and dependent on the larger
Iranian economy and their Persian neighbors. Instead the
carpet merchant asserted, "we are not Persians, but we ARE

Hors ligne


#3 06-12-2010 19:42:57

Réputation :   52 

Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Celui ci sur les manoeuvres Baku-Ankara-Naxichevan-Teheran

Reference ID     Created     Released     Classification     Origin
09BAKU175     2009-03-06 09:09     2010-11-28 18:06     SECRET//NOFORN     Embassy Baku

DE RUEHKB #0175/01 0650955
P 060955Z MAR 09

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000175


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019

REF: A) BAKU 139 B) BAKU 132 C) BAKU 80 D) 2008 BAKU



¶1.  (S)  According to widespread rumor, many Iranians in Baku
are involved full- or part-time in Iranian regime-related
profit making, sanctions-busting, money laundering, and
similar activities.  Activities range from assisting Iranian
interests "on the side" of pursuing private activities, to
working primarily for Iranian government entities.  These
Iranians' formal businesses in Azerbaijan include factories,
construction companies, trading companies, and shops, some of
which may be hollow companies hiding illicit or semi-licit
activities.  Some are also said to be significant actors in
obtaining spare parts and equipment for the Revolutionary
Guard, raising revenues and managing money for it and/or
regime figures, or managing Iran-origin narcotics
trafficking.  The list is a "sampler" of the types of
personnel and activities singled out to Iran watcher by
multiple sources as actively involved in Iranian
regime-supportive financial and procurement activities.  The
list suggests the extensive and complex interconnection of
Iranian figures and activities that reportedly support
Iranian security organizations and regime figures.  End

¶2.  (S) Baku Iran watcher received the information below from
a wide variety of independent Iranian and Azerbaijani sources
(strictly protect), including Baku-based Iranian students,
business figures, and human rights activists; a Tehran-based
Iranian exporter; a prominent businessman working in Iran;
the Executive Director of AmCham in Azerbaijan; an
Azerbaijani oil company executive; and a local partner in a
leading international management consulting firm.  In almost
all cases the information below was related/confirmed
separately by at least three of the above sources.

¶3.  (S) Please note that, while serious efforts have been
made to cross-check the information below and ignore
"indirect" claims, Iran watcher has no independent ability to
verify these allegations.  Although some of these figures are
well known in Baku and/or among the resident Iranian
community, Baku Iran watcher has never met any of them.  The
information below should be interpreted in this context.

¶4.  (S) Begin List:

¶A.  (S) Jamal Allavi.  Three Iranian sources claimed that
Allavi is a close relative of the ex-Mayor of Ardebil, and a
former colleague/friend of President Ahmedinajad.  He now
runs several Iranian companies (mostly trading), and is the
head of a provincial cooperative organization "Tavanee
Marzneshinan Fedayan Velayat," entitled to export and import
items with reduced restrictions.  Allavi has a house in Baku
and frequently travels on business to Azerbaijan, Russia,
China, and Kazakhstan.  He uses his businesses as a cover for
procuring and importing military spare parts and other items
needed by the Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security
forces, bribing customs officials as necessary.  A fourth
Iranian source noted that, while he did not know Allavi, the
company name is a "giveaway" of Revolutionary Guard/regime

¶B.  (S) FNU "Lotfi".  Runs a large artificial leather factory
in Ardebil ("Kharkhaneye Charmeh Masnui)", and other
businesses based in Iranian Azerbaijan.  He is a close
associate of Jamal Allavi (entry "A" above), with whom he
cooperates in smuggling activities.  He is an officer in the
Revolutionary Guard (possibly retired), and his businesses
are actually Revolutionary Guard-owned.  He travels to
Malaysi, Singapore, Dubai, Turkey, and Iraq as well as
zerbaijan on Revolutionary Guard business.  He als assists
Revolutionary Guard and/or Iranian intelligence operations by
"getting for them what they need," including communications
equipment and technical information.

¶C.  (S) Adil Sharabiani.  An Iranian currency exchange dealer
with "close links" to Tehran.  He was formerly a manager of

BAKU 00000175  002 OF 004

Bank Melli Iran, and currently has a close business
relationship with the Xalq Bank, a medium-sized bank in Baku.
He came to Azerbaijan after going bankrupt in Iran under
murky circumstances.  He is wealthy and reportedly works
closely with the Iranian "Foundation for the Oppressed"
(Banyadeh Mostazafan), overseeing its business and investment
activities in Azerbaijan, and advising the management of the
Foundation-owned Darya Soap Detergent company in Azerbaijan
(headed by one "Farzandeh").  He also assists another Iranian
foundation that is providing financial assistance to
Azerbaijani refugees from Karabagh with up to 300 Manat per
family per month (about $350).

An Iranian contact said that a friend had recently witnessed
Sharabiani delivering five million dollars in cash "from
Iran" to the Bank of Baku that was not entered on the books.
The Iranian source did not know whether the money represented
a personal payment to Sharabiani or a disbursement entrusted
to him for some other purpose.  The anti-regime source
alleged that Sharabiani "periodically" makes such deliveries
to the Bank.  An Iranian businessman separately told Iran
watcher that Sharabiani has "very good relations" with the
Iranian government, and is widely assumed by other Iranians
to be assisting both regime organizations and individual
regime/clerical figures in investment and money laundering

Note: The Xalq Bank was established using former staff of the
Bank of Baku (see 'E" below).  It is one of the most popular
Baku banking venues in Azerbaijan for Iranian businesses and
Iranians in Iran.  Two other popular banks for Iranians are
the "Royal Bank of Baku," owned by an Iranian-American (ref
C), and the "Bank of Baku."  End Note).

¶D.  (S) Kamal Darvishi.  This individual and his three
brothers were famous fighters during the Iran-Iraq war.
Kamil  rose to the rank of General in the Revolutionary
Guard, and formerly had important Teheran-area security and
intelligence duties.  He and his brother Keyoumars began
coming to Azerbaijan regularly ten years ago.  Although from
a very poor family, they are both extremely wealthy.  Kamal
owns several road and other infrastructure construction
companies in Iran, and formerly effectively controlled much
of this sector in Iran (according to a Teheran businessman,
"no roads in Iran could be built without him or his friends
as a partner.)"

Darvishi formerly ran the "NASR" company, an alleged
Revolutionary Guard-controlled business in Iran.  Some of his
business activities and networking reportedly aroused
suspicion, resulting in his official "retirement" from the
Revolutionary Guard.  In recent years Darvishi has developed
a close business relationship/friendship with Azerbaijan
Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and  with
Mammedov's assistance has won at least eight major road
construction and rehabilitation contracts, including
contracts for construction of the Baku-Iranian Astara
highway, the Baku-Guba highway, and the BaQ ring highway.
(Comment: We assume Mammedov is a silent partner in these
contracts.  Mammedov's immediate family owns Azerbaijan's
largest commercial development company, and he is notoriously
corrupt even for Azerbaijan.  Iran watcher has heard many
allegations from Azerbaijani contacts of creative corrupt
practices involving highway construction here.  End Comment).

Iranian business and student contacts asserted that Darvishi
maintains close relations with the Revolutionary Guard and
Iranian intelligence.  Two noted that he travels freely
abroad, in violation of ten-year legal limitations on
personal foreign travel by retired senior Revolutionary Guard
officers.  An Iranian student reported that Darvishi is
recruiting among Iranian students in Azerbaijan for work in a
new company he is establishing here.

¶E.  (S) Jamsheed "Jushkar" Mahmudoglu. He and his brothers
are Iranian Azerbaijanis who have obtained Turkish
citizenship.  They are large shareholders in the Bank of
Baku, which is sometimes presented as a "Turkish bank."  They
are originally from Tabriz, where the family were wealthy
gold and currency dealers who lost their business after the
Iranian Revolution.  The family fled to Turkey and ultimately

BAKU 00000175  003 OF 004

obtained Turkish passports.  Their business deals in
Azerbaijan and Iran are frequently entwined with the Oromi
brothers, another former Tabrizi-now-Turkish family active in
Azerbaijan and Iran.  They and the Oromis set up the Silsila
General Trading company in Dubai under the aegis of the NAB
Group.  In Iran they jointly own a company which produces
boilers on license from a German company (Bosch).  In
Azerbaijan they cooperated in the establishment of the Baku
Electronics company and the Bank of Baku (the latter in
partnership with the family of former Minister of Economic
Development Farhad Aliyev, see below).  Unlike the Oromis,
Jamsheed reportedly remains a major shareholder in this bank.

Two Iranian sources repeated "rumors" that this son is
working with a son of Ayatollah Rafsanjani in several
business ventures.  Jamsheed has relations with prominent
Azerbaijani and Iranian business and government figures, and
allegedly does favors for Iranian government personnel,
including facilitating of desired foreign items and money
laundering.  The President of AmCham in Baku (protect)
confirmed that Jamsheed is a major bank shareholder, and
originally from Iran.  She nd other sources opined that the
bank is one of he more "professionally run" in Baku.
(Comment: The bank is known for its relations with Turkish
companies.  The Bank of Baku was formerly controlled by the
brother of Farhad Aliyev, a former Azerbaijani Minister of
Economic Development who is currently jailed.  According to a
prominent Azerbaijani business consultant (strictly protect),
Aliyev's position has been divided between the Azerbaijani
Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and the Head of
Presidential Security, Vahid Akhundov.  End Comment).

¶F.  (S) Shahram Oromi.  An Iranian Azerbaijani who obtained
Turkish citizenship after the Iranian revolution.
Nonetheless, he attended university in Iran, graduating from
Iran Azad university (1993).  He and his brothers Nadir and
Bahram established the "Turkish" NAB Foreign Trade company
(Deesh Ticaret Limited Sherkati) in 1988.  The company
(headquartered in Istanbul) does extensive trading between
Turkey and the Middle East and Iran.  It is active in
Azerbaijan, and also present in Russia and other CIS
countries.  Since 1995 this company has been the distributor
of Hyundai cars in Azerbaijan, and a member of the family is
reportedly the Agent for Samsung in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The consultant describes the Oromi brother's business mode as
based on "establishing insider monopolies or advantages via
relations with powerful government individuals and their
relatives" in the various countries in which they operate,
"using bribes, 'gifts,' or offers of a share in their

The Oromis helped set up the Bank of Baku (see item "E'
above), and Shahram served in various positions (ranging from
Chief of the Financial Audit Department to Chairman) between
1999-2007, however they have recently sold most of their
shares in this bank to influential Azerbaijanis.  The Oromi's
allegedly work cooperatively in areas requested by senior
Iranian figures, and several of their businesses may
facilitate regime (or regime member) interests.  Shahram was
and remains close to former Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan
Ahmed Qazai.

¶G.  (S) "Asgar" LNU (commonly known in Baku as "Agaya Asgar).
His private company is located at #16 Gorbanov Street in
Baku, next to the Nizami metro station.  His formal business
is Iran-Russia timber and wood products export/import via
Azerbaijan.  A native of Iranian Azerbaijan, Asgar has an
Azerbaijani wife and has lived in Baku for several years.
He works closely with political officers based at the Iran
Culture House (ref B).  His wife is the cousin of the
Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov, and
Mardanov's brother is one of his business partners.  Irada
Afetgizi, an Iranian who helped organize an anti-Israel
"Islamic world" conference held at the Baku Media Center in
2007, works in his office.  Asgar owns two homes in Baku and
hosts visiting Iranian clerics and relatives of Iranian
regime officials and senior Revolutionary Guard officers.  He
has close ties to Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard
organizations and individuals, and assists them in business
activities.  He often travels to Moscow.

¶H.  (S) Jabrail Naveed "Azerbaijani."  A famous "fixer" for

BAKU 00000175  004 OF 004

Iranians in Azerbaijan (hence his nickname).  He was head of
the Iranian Trader's Association in Azerbaijan until that
organization closed in the late 1990's.  An Iranian
manufacturer and exporter from Tehran who has known the
family for years (strictly protect) noted that "he is very
wealthy, but doesn't flaunt it."  He said that Naveed's wife
formerly worked in Iran as an officer in Bank Melli, where
she facilitated loans to unqualified regime bigwigs and their

Three contacts separately claimed that Naveed has facilitated
Iran-related energy business ventures with the State Oil
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and illicitly exports (falsely
labeled) Pelite and other oil drilling materials and
chemicals and propane gas.  Naveed also reportedly owns the
"Pingvin" iron workshop in Azerbaijan.  The Tehran
businessman said that Naveed helps facilitate import of
sanctioned products into Iran from Russia and elsewhere via
the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchevan, and said that he
himself is one of "many" legitimate Iranian exporters who
have been pressured into cooperating in this activity.
Naveed is a close friend of the head of Baku's Husseiniya
("Iranian") mosque, Mullah Ogagnejad, and oversees the
mosques' administration.  Ogagnejad is a son-in-law of the
late Ayatollah Meshkini, and the personal religious
representative of Ayatollah Khameini in Azerbaijan (ref B).

¶I.  (S) Safa Naveed.  Son of Jabrail Naveed (above).  A
graduate of Baku's Kavkaz university, he is currently a
Revolutionary Guard officer working at the Iranian Embassy in
Baku.  He is a leadliaison with Iranian students in
Azerbaijan.  AnIranian student described Safa's duties as
"spyig on" Iranian students in Baku, and an Iranian
businessman who has known the family for years told Iran
watcher that Safa Naveed has frequently boasted to him about
his and Iran's knowledge of what goes on in Azerbaijan,
extensive information networks here, and "ability to get
anything it needs."  One contact described Safa as
"fanatically anti-Western."

¶J.  (S) Asgar Jabbari.  One of the "two Asgars" widely known
among Iranians in Baku (see "F" above).  Son of the late
"Mullah Natiq," a famous hard-line orator during the Iranian
revolution and the Iran-Iraq war.  Jabbari's wife is from
Azerbaijan, he owns a house here, and travels back and forth
regularly between Iran and Azerbaijan.  His main official
business is exporting Iranian marble from Isfahan, where he
works with a large factory, which is actually a Revolutionary
Guard front company (Note: Iranian marble is commonly used in
Baku residential and office-building construction, which has
been undergoing a boom here until recently.  End Note.)
Jabbari has close business relationships with senior Iranian
government officials, and carries out business activities and
buys real estate on their behalf.  (Note: Jabbari's name is
of Arabic origin, but is more likely to imply religious piety
than Arabic heritage.  End Note).

¶K.  (S) Sabir Shaheen.  Though reportedly mild-mannered and
well dressed, Shaheen is a well known mafia-like figure from
Iranian Azerbaijan who reportedly acts as a "liaison" between
the Iranian and Russian/Azerbaijani narcotics traffickers.
Although he officially operates a marble store on Baku's Karl
Marx street, the store is generally closed and Shaheen
himself is generally seen holding court at restaurants and
cafes along 28 May Street.  (Note: Iran reportedly has one of
the highest per capita rates of heroin addiction in the
world, and heroin and other narcotics trafficking from Iran
to Russia and Europe via Azerbaijan has skyrocketed over the
last two years.  See ref (D).

End List.

Hors ligne


#4 06-12-2010 19:46:03

Pascal Nicolaides

Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Merci Varouj, très intéressant !

A ce propos toujours : source TDN Hürriyet … 2010-12-06

Dernière modification par Pascal Nicolaides (06-12-2010 19:48:49)


Hors ligne


#5 07-12-2010 00:30:31


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

- 'Thread' faisant partie de la rubrique : BAKOU, PÉTRO-DOLLARS, OPÉRATIONS AZÉRIES ET AZÉRO-COMPLAISANTS  (#7)

Merci pour ces informations -que je n' ai pas encore lues. Je verrai plus tard à tête reposée.

Cependant, SVP, pensez-vous qu'il y aurait déjà des élèments concernant :

- I . Actualités : pétro-dollars et politiques azéries ?

II . Études, expositions et mécénats azéris en France ?

III . Information(s) citoyenne(s) en France ?

IV . Azéris en Turquie, dans les pays musulmans, en Europe, en France et dans le monde ?

V . Cultures-Arts en Azerbaïdjan : des non-dits flagrants sur les patrimoines arméniens ?

VI . Des falsifications historiques sur les présences arméniennes en Azerbaïdjan
- VI.Ա : avant 1816 et de 1816 à 1914
- VI.Բ : durant la Guerre 1914 à 1918 et dans la République moussavite d'Azerbaïdjan 1918 à 1920
- VI.Գ : période soviétique 1920-90

VII . La République d'Azerbaïdjan aujourd'hui

VIII . Azerbaïdjan, diplomatie internationale et relations étrangères : A/ avec le Karabagh ? B/ avec l'Arménie ? C/ avec la France ? D/ avec l'Europe ? E/ en diplomatie internationale

IX . Dénis de l'État azéri : organisations diplomatico-politico-administratives dans les médias et sur le terrain. A/ lobbyings ? B/ pogromes (1988-90) et désinformations ? C/ falsifications historiques ? D/ destructions archéologiques

X . Arménophobie haineuse azérie  ?

XI . Contre le dialogue islamo-chrétien  ?

SVP, c'est pour la page : http://www.globalarmenianheritage-adic. … eazeri.htm

Merci. Nil


Dernière modification par Adic2010 (18-10-2018 11:36:56)

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#6 03-01-2011 14:14:20


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Merci à Varouj, à Anouch, à JP, aux autres internautes du Forum et à l'équipe des NAM pour le travail de relevés et de signalisations des informations Wikileaks concernant :
- le Génocide de 1915
- le Karabagh + Bakou
- et la politique d'Ankara.

J'ai mis le logo de Wikileaks en haut de la Page d'accueil du site ADIC :

Il y aura certainement matières à des envois ciblés pour différentes informations citoyennes dans la société civile française ainsi à cette occasion des envois d'informations historico-culturelles franco-arméniennes basiques encore non connues.

Bonne après-midi. Nil.

Dernière modification par Adic2010 (03-01-2011 14:26:10)

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#7 03-01-2011 21:41:01

Réputation :   46 

Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Pari kicher Nil,
Merci a toi,
au mois toi tu est aimable,distingué.
tu apprécies le recherche que nous nous faisions.

Dernière modification par anuanu (04-01-2011 12:58:33)

Hors ligne


#8 17-03-2011 11:15:05


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Il y a maintenant France Leaks : … l=&oq= Il y aura de quoi aussi informer sur les relations Paris-Bakou aux citoyens français.

http://www.globalarmenianheritage-adic. … eazeri.htm

Bonne journée. Nil

Dernière modification par Adic2010 (17-03-2011 11:15:41)

En ligne


#9 26-12-2013 14:38:39


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets … id=5527711 . .

Dernière modification par Adic2010 (26-12-2013 14:39:49)

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#11 25-04-2017 19:37:06


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Merci à Stephane pour ce news de Julian ASSANGE qui dit :  Le génocide Arménien a tué jusqu?à 1,5 millions de personnes. Je sais, je l?ai étudié et la Turquie a tenté de le couvrir

Y a-t-il des 'Clubs Wikileaks' en France ?? où relayer ce twitt de Julian Assange... Nil.

Dernière modification par Adic2010 (18-10-2018 11:39:56)

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#12 28-04-2017 18:21:26


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

SPUTNIK.NEWS EN RUSSE : SUR JULIAN  ASSANGE, WIKILEAKS ET LE GDA1915. Il serait bon que ce news soit aussi dans les versions des autres langues étrangères. Y 'a du boulot aussi en relations publiques pour en particulier en français.

Dernière modification par Adic2010 (18-10-2018 11:40:23)

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#13 15-05-2017 09:56:02


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Dans le cadre de l'arménophobie déglinguée-débridée-organisée-exportée par l'appareil étatique (à la sauce tatare) de Bakou, cela va jusqu'à annoncer-affirmer que l'avocate Amal Cloony (libanaise) est ethniquement arménienne ! Voici une video en arménien démentant ce mensonge en fantasmagorie arménophobe : ՀԱՅԼՈՒՐ 4mn:13s / 3 mai 2016. Si j'ai bien compris, c'est signalé jusque dans le wikipedia n.azéri-à.zéro. On parle des nombreuses falsifications et propagandes mensongères de Bakou.

Tout ça, parce que Amal Cloony défend une militante des droits de l'Homme azérie. Dans la video, il y a un homme qui est avec une dame et qui parle avec micro qu'on voit au début et à 2mn:10s. SVP, c'est qui ?  Nil

Dernière modification par Adic2010 (18-10-2018 11:40:55)

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#14 08-08-2018 10:10:03


Re: wikileaks : cables diplo baku complets

Notre Varouj qui est à l'origine de ce 'thread' en décembre 2010 sur les wikileaks concernant les cables diplomatiques de Bakou, … 608#p38608 // nous a quitté si brutalement en mai 2015

Nous pouvons honorer sa mémoire en continuant de faire connaître les distorsions, falsifications et corruptions de Bakou...  dans les milieux non-hays.


Dernière modification par Adic2010 (18-10-2018 11:42:34)

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